Back to today's news: criminal complaint was unsealed Monday in federal court in Brooklyn charging two
People’s PRC intelligence officers with attempting to obstruct a criminal
prosecution in the Eastern District of New York. The defendants remain at
large.
In the
District of New Jersey, an indictment was unsealed today charging four Chinese
nationals, including three Ministry of State Security (MSS) intelligence
officers, in connection with a long-running intelligence campaign targeting
individuals in the United States to act as agents of the PRC
United States v.
Quanzhong An, et al., Eastern District of New York
An eight-count indictment was unsealed on
Oct. 20 in Brooklyn charging a total of seven nationals of the PRC – Quanzhong
An, 55, of Roslyn, New York; Guangyang An, 34, of Roslyn, New York; Tian Peng,
38, of the PRC; Chenghua Chen of the PRC; Chunde Ming of the PRC; Xuexin Hou,
52, of the PRC; and Weidong Yuan, 55, of the PRC – with participating in a
scheme to cause the forced repatriation of a PRC national residing in the
United States. The lead defendant, Quanzhong An, allegedly acted at the
direction and under the control of various officials with the PRC’s
government’s Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection (Provincial
Commission) – including Peng, Chen, Ming, and Hou – to conduct surveillance of
and engage in a campaign to harass and coerce a U.S. resident to return to the
PRC as part of an international extralegal repatriation effort known as
“Operation Fox Hunt.”
Quanzhong
An and Guangyang An were arrested on Thursday and were arraigned that afternoon
before U.S. Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes Jr. The remaining defendants remain
at large.
As
alleged in the indictment, the defendants participated in an international
campaign to threaten and intimidate John Doe-1, a resident of United States,
and his family to force John Doe-1 to return to the PRC. These efforts were
part of “Operation Fox Hunt,” an initiative by the PRC’s Ministry of Public
Security to locate and repatriate alleged fugitives who flee to foreign countries,
including the United States. The PRC government has targeted these alleged
fugitives and their families to compel cooperation with the PRC government and
self-repatriation to the PRC. The PRC government has taken such law enforcement
actions on U.S. soil in a unilateral manner without approval, of or
coordination with the U.S. government.
Quanzhong
An, who is a businessman operating in Queens, New York, and the majority
shareholder of a hotel in Flushing, acted as the primary U.S.-based liaison for
the Provincial Commission’s targeting of John Doe-1 and his family members,
including his son, John Doe-2, both in the United States and in the PRC. As
part of the scheme, various PRC-based conspirators forced a relative in the PRC
(John Doe-3) to travel from the PRC to the United States in September 2018 to
meet with John Doe-2 and convey threats that were intended to coerce John
Doe-1’s return to the PRC. Yuan – John Doe-3’s superior at the PRC’s State
Administration of Taxation – escorted John Doe-3 from the PRC to the United
States, under the guise of a visit with a tour group.
PRC-based
defendants and coconspirators also engaged in a pattern of harassment targeting
John Doe-1’s family members. In November 2017, Hou wrote John Doe-2 warning him
that “coming back and turning yourself in is the only way out.” Hou further
threatened that “avoidance and wishful thinking will only result in severe
legal punishments.” The PRC government also harassed John Doe-1 and John Doe-2
through the filing of a lawsuit in New York State court, alleging that John
Doe-1 had stolen funds from his former PRC based employer and that John Doe-2
had knowledge of and benefitted from his father’s scheme.
In a
series of recorded meetings in 2020, 2021, and 2022, Quanzhong An repeatedly met
with John Doe-2 and attempted to persuade John Doe-2 to cause the return of
John Doe-1 to the PRC. In these meetings, Quanzhong An acknowledged that he is
a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which enforces the rules and regulations of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) abroad. At various times, he attributed his
instructions to Chen, Ming, and Peng and acknowledged that the Fox Hunt
operation was motivated by the PRC government’s need to “save their faces” and
repatriate as many fugitives as possible.
Quanzhong
An admitted that he was acting as an agent of the Provincial Commission to
increase his standing in the PRC. During his meetings with John Doe-2,
Quanzhong An repeatedly transmitted threats on behalf of the PRC government. If
John Doe-1 did not return, the PRC government would “keep pestering you, [and]
make your daily life uncomfortable,” in addition to actions to “target and
monitor” John Doe-1’s relatives in the PRC. On another occasion, he stated that
“they will definitely find new ways to bother you” and “it is definitely true
that all of your relatives will be involved.”
As set
forth in the detention memorandum, Quanzhong An met with John Doe-2 again on
Sept. 29, 2022. During this meeting, Quanzhong An pressed for John Doe-1 to
execute an agreement to return to the PRC in advance of the CCP’s 20th National
Congress, which began on Oct. 16, 2022. As part
United States v.
Dong He, et al., Eastern District of New York
A criminal complaint was unsealed Monday in
federal court in Brooklyn charging two People’s Republic of China (PRC)
intelligence officers with attempting to obstruct a criminal prosecution in the
Eastern District of New York. The defendants remain at large.
According
to court documents, Dong He, aka Guochun He and aka Jacky He, and Zheng Wang,
aka Zen Wang, allegedly orchestrated a scheme to steal files and other
information from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New
York related to the ongoing federal criminal investigation and prosecution of a
global telecommunications company (Company-1) based in the PRC, including by
paying a $41,000 Bitcoin bribe to a U.S. government employee who the defendants
believed had been recruited to work for the PRC, but who in fact was a double
agent working on behalf of the FBI.
Dong He
and Zheng Wang are charged with attempting to obstruct a criminal prosecution
of Company-1 in federal district court in the Eastern District of New York.
Defendant He also is charged with money laundering based upon a bribe payment
of $41,000 in Bitcoin made in furtherance of the scheme.
According
to the complaint, the defendants are PRC intelligence officers conducting
foreign intelligence operations targeting the United States, on behalf of the
PRC government and for the benefit of Company-1. Starting in 2019, they
directed an employee at a U.S. government law enforcement agency (GE-1), whom
they believed they had recruited as an asset, to steal confidential information
about the criminal prosecution of Company-1 in order to interfere with that
prosecution. In actuality, GE-1 was working as a double agent on behalf of the
FBI.
In
September 2021, the defendants tasked GE-1 with reporting about meetings that
GE-1 was purportedly having with prosecutors in Brooklyn at the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Eastern District of New York. In written communications, the
defendants said they were particularly interested in knowing which Company-1
employees had been interviewed by the government and in obtaining a description
of the prosecutors’ evidence, witness list and trial strategy.
In
October 2021, GE-1 used an encrypted messaging program to send the defendants a
single page from a purported internal strategy memorandum from the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York regarding the Company-1
case. The document appeared to be classified as “SECRET” and to discuss a plan to
charge and arrest two current Company-1 employees living in the PRC. Dong He
responded that the document was “exactly what I am waiting for” and that he was
“waiting for the feedback from some guys” about whether there were any
questions about the document. Dong He then paid GE-1 approximately $41,000 in
Bitcoin for stealing that document.
GE-1
also asked the defendants for any feedback about the “SECRET” document. In
November 2021, Dong He stated that “[Company-1] didn’t give me specifically
feedback now yet, but they are obviously interested in it, and my boss and they
need further information.” Dong He further told GE-1 that “[Company-1]
obviously will be interested” in GE-1 stealing another part of the strategy
memorandum, and “maybe will offer more” for that information. In December 2021,
in response to a further request by GE-1 for feedback or guidance from
Company-1 about “what they want me to get,” Dong He explained that “they didn’t
give me any positive feedback yet and demanded to communicate with you
directly.” Dong He said that he refused Company-1’s request to speak directly
to GE-1 because “it’s too dangerous.
United States v.
Wang Lin et al., District of New Jersey
A federal indictment was unsealed Monday charging four Chinese nationals, including three Ministry of State Security
(MSS) intelligence officers, in connection with a long-running intelligence
campaign targeting individuals in the United States to act as agents of the
PRC.
As
alleged in the indictment, from at least 2008 to 2018, Wang Lin, 59; Bi
Hongwei, age unknown; Dong Ting, aka Chelsea Dong, 40; Wang Qiang, 55, and
others engaged in a wide-ranging and systematic effort to target and recruit
individuals to act on behalf of the PRC in the United States with requests to
provide information, materials, equipment, and assistance to the Chinese
government in ways that would further China’s intelligence objectives. These
recruitment efforts included targeting professors at universities, a former
federal law enforcement and state homeland security official, and others to act
on behalf of, and as agents of, the Chinese government.
As part
of the conspiracy, MSS intelligence officers Wang Lin, Dong Ting, and others
used a purported academic institute at Ocean University of China – referred to
as the Institute for International Studies (IIS) – as cover for their
clandestine intelligence activities. Acting under cover as the purported
director of the IIS, Wang Lin, in coordination with other MSS operatives
operating under the guise of academics at the IIS, targeted professors at
American universities and others in the United States with access to sensitive
information and equipment.
According
to the indictment unsealed today, MSS intelligence officers Wang Lin, Bi, Dong,
and others, acting for and on behalf of the MSS and the Chinese government,
systematically targeted United States persons, including but not limited to a
coconspirator who was a resident of the state of New Jersey and a second
individual who was a former federal law enforcement officer and state homeland
security official and a professor at an American university.
Among
other things, the conspiracy targeted the second individual by inviting the
individual in 2008 and 2018 on all-expenses-paid trips to China sponsored by
the IIS. During those trips, Wang Lin, Dong, and others sought to recruit this
individual as a human source, requesting that the individual provide sensitive
fingerprint technology, information, and assistance with stopping planned
protests along the 2008 Olympic Games torch route in the United States, which
the conspirators expressed would be “embarrassing” to China. The individual
also was requested to sign a contract for purported consulting services with a
Chinese company whose “core value” was the “national interest and national
security” of China, with an objective to “protect the national interest and
Chinese enterprises’ overseas interest[s]” and to “build sources and channels
to collect security information.” Recognizing Wang Lin, Dong, and others as
Chinese intelligence officers, the individual refused these requests and
reported them to law enforcement.
The
conspiracy also targeted the coconspirator in New Jersey by tasking the
coconspirator to take specific action in the United States in furtherance of
the MSS’ intelligence objective. Wang Qiang coordinated a meeting in 2016
between the coconspirator, Wang Lin, and Bi Hongwei in the Bahamas, at which
time MSS intelligence officers Wang Lin and Bi directed the coconspirator to
obtain U.S. currency and provide it to a designated individual in New Jersey.
The coconspirator returned to New Jersey and did as Wang Lin and BI
instructed. Wang Qiang then visited the coconspirator in New Jersey, at
which time Wang Qiang and the coconspirator discussed in detail their and
others’ activities taken on behalf of the Chinese government in the United
States.
Lin,
Bi, Dong and Qiang, all are nationals and residents of the People’s Republic of
China. They each are charged in the indictment with conspiracy to act in the
United States as agents of a foreign government, namely, the People’s Republic
of China, without prior notification to the Attorney General of the United
States, as required by law, and to direct such unlawful action by others
in the United States. The conspiracy charge carries a statutory maximum term of
imprisonment of five years and a maximum fine of $250,000