All Vote-By-Mail M.OM.s Matter

 Maxine Dexter's Facebook video extols the virtue of Oregon's mail-in voting, emulating the NYT's Journalistic Malpractice.

Pundits don't matter - remember how the NYT predicted a Harris landslide win?

Polls don't matter - the GMRMR on election day declared a Harris win

Who votes don't matter

Only Democrsts who counts the votes matters

The slow count of ballots in California is just one of hundreds of indicators pointing to lack of integrity in the process. Historical data, run-away fraud, open borders, but more than anything is the law of Unintended Consequences and the Inside Threat

Have you ever heard about the Inside Threat by so-called security experts?

How about the Law of Unintended Consequences?

Or what about the Secret 2020 Election Day Meeting With CISA, Dominion, ES&S, ERIC, FBI, Leftist Organizations, State Officials, and Others?

Security professionals refer to this as the inside threat:  insiders  with a Motive have a MOM - Motive, Means and Opportunity to commit a crime.




Vote-by-mail systems, by design, create a longer physical and procedural custody chain than same-day in-person voting. That lengthens the window and multiplies the points at which an insider (or coordinated actors) can apply Motive + Opportunity + Means.

Where the chain expands Opportunity and Means Typical stages include:
Ballot printing and insertion into envelopes

Delivery via postal service or official drop boxes

Collection from drop boxes or mail facilities

Intake, sorting, and storage at election offices

Signature verification against registration files

Opening of envelopes, separation of ballots from identifying information
Tabulation (machine or hand)

Secure retention for audits or recounts

Each handoff involves people with legitimate access: postal workers, temporary election staff, permanent clerks, drop-box collectors, signature reviewers, and tabulation operators. An insider motivated by politics only needs sufficient Opportunity (unobserved access at one of those points) and Means (physical ballots, knowledge of procedures, or ability to alter records). The longer the chain and the more temporary or lightly supervised workers involved, the more surface area exists.

This is not unique to Oregon. Any jurisdiction relying heavily on mail or drop-box return faces the same structural reality. In-person Election Day voting compresses the chain (voter marks and deposits the ballot under observation in a controlled location), which reduces certain custody risks even while introducing others (poll-worker access to machines, provisional ballots, etc.).
Mitigations and residual risk

The higher the trust level, the higher the risk

In security engineering, elevated trust and elevated privilege often create the highest residual risk precisely because oversight is relaxed and the potential impact of misuse is large. Superuser or high-privilege accounts (“superpasswords”) given to “trusted” agents are classic high-value targets for both external compromise and internal abuse. MOM (Motive, Opportunity, Means) remains latent in any human system; the design goal is to shrink Opportunity and Means and raise the probability of rapid detection when Motive appears.


While empirical records from long-running VBM states (Oregon, Washington, Colorado, Utah, and others) show very low rates of proven fraudulent ballots relative to volume cast—typically measured in tiny fractions of a percent, with most issues being errors rather than coordinated outcome-altering schemes. That does not prove the risk is zero; it shows that, when procedures are followed and audited, large-scale undetected exploitation has not been the observed pattern.

The residual vulnerability remains real precisely because of the human element and the extended chain. Motive supplied by politics does not disappear. Weak implementation—lax signature standards, poorly monitored drop boxes, inadequate background checks for temporary workers, incomplete audits, or delayed access revocation—turns theoretical Opportunity into practical risk. Strong paper records plus independent audits provide a detection backstop that pure electronic systems lack, but they only work if the paper is preserved, counted, and compared honestly.

The longer custody chain of vote-by-mail systems does increase the number of points at which MOM can be applied by an insider. Effective systems treat that as a design constraint to be actively managed rather than denied

What are you trying to hide?

Visible reluctance by some mail-in ballot states to cooperate with federal requests or oversight can, and often does, make those systems appear less secure to a significant portion of the public—even when the underlying technical and procedural controls are strong.

Why the perception forms
Security confidence is not only about internal design (paper trails, signature verification, air-gapped tabulators, audits). It is also about verifiability and the willingness to subject the system to external scrutiny. When election officials publicly resist federal data requests, information-sharing, or process reviews—especially while asserting that the system is already highly secure—observers reasonably ask: if the controls are robust, why the resistance?

Opacity or selective non-cooperation creates space for the inference that there may be something to protect from outside examination. In the language of the MOM framework, reduced external visibility can be interpreted as preserving Opportunity for motivated insiders. 

That interpretation does not have to be accurate to damage confidence.

States have a strong constitutional claim. Article I, Section 4 assigns primary authority over the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections to the states, subject to congressional regulation. Many state officials cite this, plus privacy and data-protection concerns, when declining certain federal demands for voter-file data or process changes. Oregon officials, among others, have repeatedly framed federal pressure as overreach or politically motivated interference rather than neutral security cooperation.

That legal position is real. It does not, however, erase the public-relations and confidence cost. When resistance is accompanied by strong partisan rhetoric, the appearance problem intensifies: skeptics see self-protection rather than principled federalism.

A system can have solid internal mitigations (unique ballot tracking, bipartisan observation, risk-limiting audits of paper records, chain-of-custody logging) and still suffer a confidence deficit if external verification is consistently blocked or treated as hostile. Conversely, structured, privacy-protected cooperation—sharing limited data under clear legal authority, participating in joint cybersecurity assessments, or allowing independent process reviews—can strengthen both actual resilience and public trust without surrendering state control.

Persistent non-cooperation therefore functions as a signal. It does not automatically prove insecurity, but it reliably increases the perception of insecurity among those already inclined to doubt long custody chains and high-trust internal agents. In a high-stakes domain where Motive is supplied by politics, that perception gap matters.

In short: refusal to cooperate with the federal government on election matters is often legally defensible and sometimes practically justified. It is also a predictable driver of reduced public confidence in the security of the systems in question. Transparent, bounded mechanisms for external scrutiny remain one of the more effective ways to address both the residual MOM risks and the appearance problem.