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According to the August 15th report the by the Federal Reserve of New York:
“The $3.7 trillion U.S. municipal bond market is perhaps
best known for its federal tax exemption on individuals and its low default
rate relative to other fixed-income securities. These two features have
resulted in household investors dominating the ranks of municipal bond
holders.”
Individuals own three quarters of all municipal bonds; with
$1.879 billion held directly and another $930 billion through investments in
mutual funds. The Fed report emphasized that the perception of a low historical
default history of municipal bonds has played a key role in “luring
investors” to buy huge amount of municipal debt. The Fed specifically
points out the perception of low default rates is due to widely advertised
reports of low default rates by credit rating agencies. But the Fed determined
the credit rating agencies have not told the whole story about the level of
municipal bond defaults. Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) and Standard and
Poor’s (S&P), the two largest bond rating agencies, provide annual default
statistics for the municipal bonds. S&P reported that its “rated” municipal
bonds defaulted only 47 times from 1986 to 2011. Similarly, Moody’s indicates
that its “rated” municipal bonds defaulted only 71 times from 1970 to 2011.
This compares much more favorably to the record of thousands corporate bond
defaults during the same period:
But when the Fed tracked default listings from 1970 to 2011
through the Mergent and S&P Capital IQ data bases available
to institutional investors, the municipal default rates during the same periods
sky-rocket from 71 to 2,521 for Moody’s and 47 to 2,366 for S&P. The Fed
calculated that there were a total of 2,527 municipal bonds that defaulted from
the late 1950s through 2011; confirming that the real rate of municipal bond
defaults was 36 times higher than Moody’s and S&P reported to the public.
The Fed warns that information regarding municipal bonds
tends to be “self-selected”. Issuers stop seeking an annual rating from Moody’s
and/or S&P, if their bonds are likely to not receive an “investment grade”
rating. The Fed also determined “the municipal market is bifurcated into
general obligation (GO) bonds and revenue bonds”. GO bonds carry a full
faith and credit pledge of a state or local government, but revenue bonds are
backed by a pledge of revenues raised from a specific enterprise, such as an
airport, hospital, or school. According to the Fed, over the past sixteen
years, 60% to 70% of newly issued municipal bonds were revenue bonds. Many of
these projects appear to be politically justified to bankroll crony capitalist
“sustainable” investments as industrial development bonds (IDB). IDB financings
often involved new technologies or projects with no historical track record:
“the services offered by an alternative energy plant, pollution control facility, or other corporate-like entity may not be considered essential, because of the availability of other energy sources. Thus, these enterprises may have less potential to generate revenue.”
The bottom line of the Fed report is Moody’s and S&P are
culpable for understating the risks to investing in the municipal bond market.
Within 48 hours of the release of the Fed report, Moody’s acknowledged 10% of
California cities have declared fiscal crises and disclosed: “across-the-board
rating revisions are possible following a review of our ratings on California
cities over the next month or two”. Based on the Fed report and Moody’s
reaction, California and other municipal bondholders should be panicked.
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